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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff cmd Appellant,
-vs.WILBURN DALE HELM and
MARIE L. HELM, his wife,
Defendamts amd Respondents.

Case
No.10509

P'etition for Rehearing
The appellant hereby petitions the above-entitled
court for a rehearing of the above-entitled appeal on the
ground that said court erred by affirming the trial court's
Order denying plaintiff permission to file Count III of its
proposed Amended Complaint, which Count states a valid
cause of action for reformation, and by affirming the trial
court's Order denying plaintiff's motion for an Order
requiring plaintiff to make deposits into court pendente
lite.
Dated this 30th day of April, 1966.
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON
By KENT B LINEBAUGH
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Pla.intiff and Appellant

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaimtiff Otnd Appellant,
-vs.WILBURN DALE HELM and
MARIEL. HELM, his wife,
Defendants Otnd Respondents.

Case
No. 10509

Brief in Support of Petition
for Rehearing
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Originally this was an action for a Declaratory Judgment declaring and determining the meaning of a lease
between the plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as
lessors or, in the alternative, a reformation of said lease.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND
THE SUPREME COURT
Summary J udgmeut was granted in favor of the def en<lants and the plaintiff's Motions to set aside the Summary Judgment, for permission to file an Amended Complnint and for an Order requiring the plaintiff to make
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deposits in court pendente lite were denied. From the
Summary Judgment and denial of the plaintiff's Motions, the plaintiff appealed. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court, awarding costs to the
respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff seeks a rehearing on the propriety of denying plaintiff permission to file Count III of its proposed
Amended Complaint and the court's refusal to require
the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite. Pursuant to said rehearing, the plaintiff seeks an Order
granting plaintiff permission to file Count III of its proposed Amended Complaint and an Order requiring the
plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 5, 1961 the defendants Wilburn Dale Helm
and Marie L. Helm, his wife, as lessors, entered into a
written lease agreement with the plaintiff, Utah Cooperative Association. (R. 7) The leased property consisted
of a service station located on the old State Highway
just North of Orem, Utah, and the plaintiff undertook
to operate the service station pursuant to the lease agreement. (R. 3, 7, 4)
At the time of entering into the lease, the plaintiff
and the defendants were aware that the leased premises
would be used by the plaintiff as a service station and
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that the new freeway now completed between Lehi and
Provo was then being planned. (R. 3, 4, 16, 26)
Upon completion of the contemplated freeway, due
to the alteration of the flow of traffic away from the
leased premises, the plaintiff maintained to the defendants that certain provisions in the lease allowed the
plaintiff to surrender and cancel the lease and be relieved from the payment of rent or any other obligation
thereunder. (R. 5, 16, 53) However, the defendants contended that the plaintiff had no right to surrender or cancel the lease and demanded continued payment of the
monthly rental. (R. 5, 16, 18, 53) Subsequently, the
plaintiff's original Complaint was filed on July 1, 1965,
(R. 15, 22) whereby the plaintiff sought a Declaratory
Judgment which would relieve the plaintiff of any obligations whatsoever under the lease. Thereafter, the defendants answered the Complaint and moved for Summary Judgment, which judgment was granted in their
favor.
Upon notifiication of the Summary Judgment against
it, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the Summary
Judgment, (R. 55) together with motions for permission
to file an Amended Complaint, (R. 51) and for an Order
requiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente
lite. (R. 50) In Count III of the proposed Amended
Complaint, the plaintiff set forth an alternative cause of
action for reformation of the lease to make it conform
to the actual agreement of the parties. (R. 31)
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Paragraph 11 of Count III of the proposed Amende(J
Complaint alleges as follows :
11. That the following is a true agreement of
the parties with reference to paragraph 7 of said
lease agreement:

7. Lessors shall keep in force at their expense sufficient fire and comprehensive insurance on the building to pay for the repair or
construction of said building if it is damager!
or destroyed by fire or other casualty, whi<>h
policy shall contain a loss payable clause in
favor of lessee as its interest may appear. If
the premises are rendered wholly or partially
unfit for occupancy by any such damage or
destruction, or if for any reason, including the
substantial or material alteration of the florn
of traffic away f ram the leased premises as a
result of the use of the anticipated Interstate
Highway No. 15 in the Oreni, Utah area,
which hi,qhway is planned for construction
in the Orem, Utah area as of the date of this
agreement, the possession or beneficial use of
the premises is interfered with, the rent hereunder shall abate until the premises are fully
restored to fitness for occupancy or such interference has ceased. It is understood and
agreed that if by reason of any law, ordinance
or regulation of properly constituted authority or by injunction, lessee is prevented from
using- aH or any substantial or material part
of the property herein leased as a service
station for the sale and the storage of gasoline and petroleum products, or if the use of
the premises as a serviee station shall l1e in
any substantial or material manner restricted, or if the flow of traffic is substantially
or materially altered aica.y from the lrasrrl
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premises as a result of the use of the anticipated Interstate Highway No.15 in the Orem,
Utah area, which highway is planned for construction in the Orem, Utah area as of the
date of this agreement, or should any governmental authority refuse at any time during
the term or extension of this lease to grant
such permits as may be necessary for the installation of reasonable equipment and operation of said premises as a service station, then
the lessee may, at its option, surrender and
cancel this lease, remove its improvements
and equipment from said property and be
relieved from the payment of rent or any
other obligation as of the date of such surrender. (Emphasis added) (R. 34)
Paragraphs 7 and 10 of Count III of the proposed
Amended Complaint also allege that the mistake as to
the meaning of the lease agreement was a mutual
mistake between all parties to the lease or, if not a mutual
mistake, then the conduct of the defendants in failing to
advise the plaintiff that the lease agreement as reduced
to writing did not correctly embody the agreement of
the parties, was wrongful and fraudulent. (R. 33)
By its motion to the trial court requiring the plaintiff
to make deposits in court pendente lite, the plaintiff
songht the court's permission to pay into court the $275
per month reserved as rental payments under the terms
of the lease. (R. 50)
The plaintiff has not used the leased premises for any
purpose whatsoever since January 1, 1965 and since that
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date the premises have been vacant and have produced
no income to the plaintiff, (R. 53) and although the plaintiff used its best efforts to sublet or otherwise economically use the property, it has been unable to do so since
January 1, 1965. (R. 53)
Between January 1, 1965 and the time the plaintiff
filed its motion for an order requiring deposits to be made
into court pendente lite the plaintiff paid to the defendants the monthly rental of $275 per month for a total of
$2750 during which time the plaintiff received no income
from the property. (R. 53) The amount of $1100 of the
$2750 paid as aforesaid was paid between the time this
action was filed on July 1, 1965 and the filing of plaintiff's motion for the requested order. (R. 53, 54)
After a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, the trial
court :refused to set aside the Summary Judgment and
denied the plaintiff's motion for permission to file its
proposed Amended Complaint, and also denied the plaintiff's motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to make
deposits of the monthly rental in court pending the termination of the litigation. (R. 86)
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court's
Summary Judgment and Order denying the plaintiff's
motions were affirmed in an opinion filed on April 12,
1966. Said opinion makes no comment whatsoever on
the failure of the trial court to permit the plaintiff to
file Count III of its proposed Amended Complaint which
Count, as stated previously, alleges a cause of action for
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reformation of the subject lease. Likewise, said opinion
makes no reference to the trial court's failure to order
the plaintiff to make deposits into court pendente lite.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF PERMISSION
TO FILE COUNT III OF PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT
In the Supreme Court's opinion this case was characterized as an ''appeal from a decision that interpreted
a service station lease agreement.'' While such characterization is partially correct, apparently the court
overlooked the fact that the plaintiff not only sought
interpretation of the lease, but alternatively, the plaintiff sought REFORMATION of the same agreement. To
that end the plaintiff sought permission to file an Amended complaint and Count III thereof states a valid cause
of action for reformation of the lease between the parties.
Adequate grounds for such reformation were alleged inasmuch as paragraph 7 of Count III alleges a mutual mistake on the part of all parties involved, and paragraph
10 of said Count alleges that "if the defendants did not
share plaintiff's mistaken belief that the actual agreement of the parties had been reduced to writing then the
conduct of the defendants, all and each of them, in failing
to advised plaintiff that the lease agreement as reduced
to writing did not correctly embody the agreement of
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the parties was ·wrongful and fraudulent.'' Paragraph
11 then proceeds to allege the true agreement between
the parties with regard to the plaintiff's right to a total
abatement of rent or termination of the lease agreement.
This jurisdiction recognizes and accepts the well established rule that an instrument is subject to reformation on the ground of mutual mistake or fraud. In Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Ut. 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957) Mr.
Justice McDonough, writing for a unanimous court,
stated:
''There are numerous cases in this jurisdiction
dealing with reformation of an instrument on the
ground of mutual mistake. The guiding criteria
are well established. Mutual mistake of fact may
be defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to writing. . .. ''
Earlier in McMahon v. Tan!Jier, 122 Ut. 333, 249 P.
2d 502 (1952), a unanimous Utah court held as follows
at 249 P. 2d 506:
"The principal applicable ... is well stated in the
case of Spirit vs. Albert, 109 Conn. 292, 146 Atlantic 717, 720: 'Where unknown to one of the parties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering
it as variance with the prior understanding and
a(J'reement of the parties, and the other party
.
learns of this mistake at the time of the execution
of the instrument and later seeks to take advanta 0O'e of it equity will reform the instrument so as
to make it conf~rm to the prior understanding.' "
~

So far as we are able to determine, the law of the State
of Utah is no different today.
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Although the plaintiff first attempted to reform the
subject lease by way of its proposed Amended Complaint,
we fail to perceive any reason why both the trial court
and the Supreme Court refused to permit the pleading
of the cause of action for reformation. Our Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 15 authorizes amended and supplemental
pleadings as fallows:
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may still amend it at any
time within twenty days after it is served. Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given wh-en
Justice so requires. A party shall plead in response
to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within ten days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the
court otherwise orders. (Emphasis added)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8( e) provides as
follows:
A party may set forth two or more statements
of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate counts
or defenses. \Vhen two or more statements are
made in the alternative and one of them made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is
not made insufficient bv the insufficiency of one or
more of the altrrnativ~ statements. A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as
he has, regardless of consistency, and whether
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based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both.
All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
Also relevant to this inquiry is Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 18(a) which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in its
complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth
a counterclaim may join either as independent or
as alternate claims as many claims legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing
party....
From the foregoing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
it is apparent that Count III of the plaintiff's proposed
Amended Complaint was not unacceptable because it was
joined with other claims in the proposal, nor because
alternative relief was prayed for, nor because the claims
described therein may not have been entirely consistent.
More particularly, Rule 15 clearly indicates that permission to amend a pleading shall be liberally granted.
As was stated by Justice Wade in Ballard v. Buist, 8 Ut.
2d 308, 333 P. 2d 1071 (1959):
It has always been the rule in this State to be
liberal in the allowance of amendments to the
end that there can be a complete adjudication of
the controversy upon the merits and so that justice
may be served.

In addition, although it was decided prior to the enactment of our present Rule 15, Prom City Y. Claudin, 91 Ut.
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60, 63 P. 2d 570 (1936) contains the following pertinent
comment by Justice Wolfe:
It must be noted that the court may, upon sustaining a demurrer, refuse to permit an amendment to a pleading if it deems no amendment can
he made which will circumvent the ruling.... In
such case, the pleader is virtually out of court,
it is as if the court had said, 'your pleading is not
good in law and, under the facts as I apprehend
they can be pleaded, you cannot state a good action
or defense in law.' Naturally, it is not usually done
on a :first complaint or answer because the court
cannot ordinarily know that other facts to make
the pleading good cannot be pleaded. And a refusal to permit pleading over where it does not
appear positive that no cause of action or defense
can be pleaded may run easily into an abuse of
discretion.
Upon application of the criteria described by Justice
Wolfe, it is submitted that Count III of the plaintiff's
proposed Amended Complaint does ''state a good
action.'' Thus, the refusal on the part of the trial court
and the Supreme Court to permit the pleading of Count
III is improper. Unlike Counts I and II of the proposed
Amended Complaint, which Counts the Supreme Court
considered. and rejected in its recent decision, Count III
is not defective because the language of the lease agreement is clearly against the plaintiff. On the contrary, the
purpose of reforming the lease is to change that which
is clear, but does not express the agreement of the parties.
Nor does the claim for reformation of the agreement run
Rfoul of the parol evidence rule since that rule is not
applicable to an action for reformation. (See Sine v.
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Harper, 118 Ut. 415, 222 P. 2d 571 (1950) and Degnan,
Parol Evidence - The Utah Version, 5 Utah Law Review, 158, 175 (1956).)
\Ve simply cannot conceive of any legitimate reason
why the trial court and the Supreme Court have refused to permit plaintiff to file its proposed Amended
Complaint so far as Count III is concerned. The holding in Lone Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Citroeon Cars
Corporation, ( C.A. 5th, 1961) 288 F. 2d 69, is in point. It
was there held that where no grounds whatsoever exist
for denial of leave to amend a pleading, the test for
abuse of discretion is satisfied and the trial court must
be reversed upon appeal. Not ha Ying been allowed to
file its claim for reformation, the plaintiff has not had the
opportunity to present evidence in support thereof. Thus,
the refusal to allow prosecution of Count III is tantamount to a dismissal of the cause of action for reformation of the lease without any hearing whatsoever. Surely,
such refusal is an abuse of discretion.
In the present case, the plaintiff's motion for leaYe
to file the proposed Amended Complaint was made within
ten days after the plaintiff received notice that the defendants' motion for Summary Judgment had been granted. In addition: no prejudice whatsoever would haw
resulted to the defendants had the plaintiff been allowed
to plead Count III as proposed, plaintiff's motion was
the first occasion permission to so plead had been sought,
the motion was not an attempt to delay the proceedings,
nor can it be saicl tlw motion was made in bad faith. Thr

letter as well as the spirit of the law applicable to this
issue clearly entitle the plaintiff to a hearing on its claim
for reformation of the lease agreement.

POINT NO. 2
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO MAKE
DEPOSITS OF THE MONTHLY RENTAL
INTO COURT PENDENTE LITE
In the event the plaintiff is not permitted to file Count
III of its proposed Amended Complaint as contended for
in Point No. 1 of this brief, the issue raised by this Point
No. 2 is moot and requires no consideration. However,
assuming the court reverses itself as urged and the plaintiff is permitted to file Count III of its proposed Amended Complaint then the plaintiff submits that affirmation
of the trial court's Order denying plaintiff's motion for
an Order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits of the
monthly rental into court pendente lite was erroneous.
The reader is directed to the plaintiff's brief on file
herein, pp. 26-35, for Points and Authorities in support of
plaintiff's eonteution in this Point No. 2.
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CONCLUSION
For those reasons hereinabove set forth the court
should grant a rehearing in this case for the purpose of
reconsidering only those issues raised by the petition for
rehearing. Totally absent from the court's original opinion is any reason why the plaintiff should not be permitted to file Count III of its proposed Amended Complaint and make deposits of the monthly rental into court
pendente lite.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON
By KENT B LINEBAUGH
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Pla.intiff and Appellant

